Any intellectual position that becomes too easy to dismiss poses a problem, whether it is in religion, politics, or culture. Such dismissals end up transforming serious intellectual positions, such as liberalism and conservatism, into caricatures to which only the silliest of ideologues could hold. This does violence to the integrity of these ideas and those that are or have been deluded enough to hold them.
This is precisely what has happened to formalism and its unsavory co-conspirators "autonomy," "disinterestedness," and "art for art's sake" in art and aesthetics. Formalism holds that art is a self-contained entity sealed off from other objects in the world and that the experience of art is to be distinguished from other experiences in the world. A painting's meaning, then, is determined through its internal structure, that is, the line, forms, and color that comprise it. The eighteenth century German philosopher Immanuel Kant is usually credited (or blamed) for developing the philosophical foundation for this position in Critique of Judgment (1790) and Clement Greenberg, the most influential art critic of the twentieth century and apologist for Abstract Expressionism in the 1940s, applied its principles in developing his own distinctive history of modern art. Despite the power of their thought and influence, both Kant and Greenberg are nowadays invoked by right-thinking critics, art historians, and curators (especially curators) only to be dismissed and to serve as foils for the more enlightened and progressive approaches to art, approaches which affirms its participation in a broader, less "elitist" contexts, whether the artist's intentional and biographical context, historical and social context, or the viewer's own interpretive context.
Although I too am critical of Kantian and Greenbergian excesses and distortions, I have recently come to acknowledge the importance of what I would call a pragmatic, or "soft," formalism. A work of art's value cannot be reduced to what exists outside it, whether that is what the work depicts, the intentions of its maker, its historical, social and political context, or the intentions of its viewers. The work of art has some internal meaning. It is a tense and dynamic hypostatic union between form and content, between its presence as an artifact and its capacity to reference the world of meaning and experience outside it. This means that even though a painting may depict a vase of flowers, a sunset, or a human figure it always remains a flat artifact, albeit a painted one. This is not merely Kantian or Greenbergian theory. This is the essence of painting, including cave paintings and icons.
A soft or pragmatic formalism that recognizes the internal formal mechanics of painting helps keep the attention focused first and last on the painting itself and on the painting as a painted artifact. Deprived of this tether, many critics move a little too quickly from a painting's form to its content and then from the painting itself to its myriad of contexts. Without a basic formalist vocabulary that can account for the union of form and content, that union that makes a work of art a work of art, and which can offer an analysis of the mechanics of how a painting works, then there remains in the end little reason to pay much attention to the object at all. The critic must tarry in the between of form and content. Although his critical insights brought him into this between, Greenberg feared it and moved too quickly to the terra firma of pure form. (Philosopher William Desmond suggests that Kant too found himself in the between, the between of self and Other which terrified him and so his philosophical system is in fact an ingenious fortress to protect him from the between.)
Critics of Greenbergian formalism tend to err in the opposite direction. They dissolve this between by rushing to the safe havens of content, imagery, and context. This is often what those scholars and critics who are interested in art's religious and spiritual meaning do.They will extract an image from a painting, like a cross (or, in my own case, a chocolate Easter bunny), and perform an iconographical analysis. The problem is that such analysis doesn't actually require the particularity of that cross and its function in that painting. It thus becomes merely a visual catalyst for religious and spiritual reflection that exists outside the work. We thus can find ourselves in the uncomfortable position in which the work of art is actually powerless to do anything except move us toward something else, toward religious or spiritual meaning, for example, that exists outside or beyond the work.
Many critics who eschew formalism have immense trouble standing in front of a painting and talking about how it actually works as a painting—not as a visual illustration of the artist’s intentions, or as a door that opens onto political, social, or religious "content" but its internal mechanics as a painted artifact. When I am in an artist's studio and she asks me what I think of that unfinished painting leaning against the wall, he is not asking me to riff on the iconographical meaning of the tree, seascape, or figure. She is not asking me to reflect on her intentions or biography or to explore the institutional, social, and political contexts that determined its making. She is asking me whether the painting, as a painted artifact, actually works. Does this line work there? Does this color work there? If this sounds too "formalist," then the baby has indeed been thrown out with the bathwater. The relationship between form and content, between presence and reference should never be ignored or dissolved. The responsibility of the critic is to keep alive the movement from one to the other and back again, which ultimately reveals what is truly remarkable about painting. This does not mean that the artist's intentions, historical and social context, and the viewer's "horizon of expectation" are in any way denied. It is, however, to assert that they proceed from and return to the dynamic between of the artifact's form and content. And I am convinced that it is in this between that a painting's distinctive embodiment of transcendence, where its particular religious and spiritual presence, is found. And this requires the critical language of formalism.
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